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The purpose of this report is to describe the current state of poverty in California, to discuss concrete steps that could be taken to reduce poverty in California, and to 
present the best available evidence on the likely effects of 
those steps. we take on an important but infrequently-posed 
question: if California were to seriously commit to reducing 
poverty, how might that commitment best be realized?  
this is of course a hypothetical question, as there is no evidence that 
California is poised to make such a serious commitment, nor have many 
other states gone much beyond the usual lip service proclamations. it is 
nonetheless especially striking that California, the highest-poverty state in 
the country, has not rushed in to rectify the matter.1 
there are many reasons for this seeming complacency, but an especially 
important one is that most people think that poverty is intractable and 
that viable solutions to it simply don’t exist. when Californians know what 
needs to be done, they tend to go forward and get it done. when, for exam-
ple, the state’s roads are in disrepair, there are rarely paralyzing debates 
about exactly how to go about fixing them; and instead we proceed with 
the needed repairs as soon as the funds to do so are appropriated. the 
same type of sure and certain prescription might appear to be unavailable 
when it comes to fixing poverty. it is hard not to be overwhelmed by the 
cacaphony of voices yielding a thick stream of narrow-gauge interven-
tions, new evaluations, and piecemeal proposals.2 
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although the research literature on poverty is indeed 
large, recent advances have been so fundamental that 
it is now possible to develop a science-based response 
to poverty. if in the past we just didn’t know what to do 
about poverty, that is simply no longer the case. the 
causes of poverty are well established, and the effects 
of many possible policy responses to poverty are like-
wise well established. 
this is not to gainsay the difficulty of the task before us. 
to date, no attempt has been made to sort exhaustively 
through the full complement of evidence on poverty 
reform and interventions that might work in California, 
no doubt mainly because that evidence is so far flung. 
the relevant literature can be found variously in sub-
fields pertaining to prenatal and postnatal interventions, 
child development and child care, early childhood edu-
cation, community schools, place-based interventions, 
after-school interventions, low-income tax credits, 
minimum wage reform, vocational training, workforce 
development, and of course much more. Because the 
field is so differentiated, an expert may be able to mas-
ter the literature in one or two of the relevant subfields, 
but not typically the field in its entirety. 
we have accordingly proceeded by first reviewing each 
of these subfields separately and then culling from 
these reviews the results that were most important and 
relevant in building a poverty-reduction plan. it is only 
the latter results that appear in this (relatively) abbrevi-
ated report. For our purposes here, the objective is not 
to provide a comprehensive summary of those back-
ground reviews, but rather to engage very selectively 
with the evidence that is most relevant for the types of 
poverty found in California and the types of programs 
and policies that might be implemented in California. 
the full set of reviews that stand behind this report will 
be posted on the website for the stanford Center on 
poverty and inequality (www.inequality.com). 
we have no interest in issuing an academic report 
about policies that will never be undertaken. we have 
much interest, by contrast, in laying out policies and 
programs that could plausibly garner support and that 
would reduce poverty substantially insofar as that sup-
port is garnered. in assembling this report, we have 
accordingly taken very seriously the key values and 
commitments that are widely shared within the united 
states, values and commitments that affect the types 
of programs that we are likely to embrace and call our 
own. there is little point, for example, in attempting to 
incorporate programs or policies that rest on a wholly 
foreign set of values, even if those programs or policies 
are proven poverty-reducers. it is not simply that such 
programs would likely be opposed by many Califor-
nians and therefore never come to fruition. Even if they 
were somehow implemented, the resulting programs 
would never feel like our own, would not mesh well with 
our existing institutions, and would likely be mired in 
controversy from the start. 
we have also sought to work within the constraints 
of California’s institutions, programs, and policies. as 
a result, our proposal mainly entails building on Cali-
fornia’s existing safety net, in effect ramping up those 
programs for which the evidence is strong. we have also 
sought to build on and exploit various reforms under 
way in California (e.g., health care reform, local Con-
trol Funding Formula). the goal, in short, is to build a 
comprehensive reform package that rests on programs 
backed by the best science, that integrates seamlessly 
with the existing safety net, and that builds on initiatives 
already in play.
this essay presents in summary form the package of 
reforms that emerged out of this review and that, taken 
together, offer an unprecedented opportunity to reduce 
poverty in California. the package is motivated by a 
commitment to equalize access to investments in skill 
and to ensure that those who work hard will not be in 
poverty.
although the heart of our report is a presentation of the 
evidence behind these reforms, we first discuss the main 
features of poverty in California, the main ways in which 
California’s safety net responds to poverty, and the role 
of science in informing poverty policy. we then turn to a 
lengthier discussion of (a) the key evidence on behalf of 
our equal opportunity approach, (b) the various ways in 
which this approach might be implemented, and (c) the 
rationale for holding off—for now—on a major program 
to increase take-up of existing programs. we conclude 
by discussing the extent to which these reforms would 
address the distinctive features of poverty in California.
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does California have a disTinCTive brand of poverTy? 
The groundwork for this review is usefully laid by discussing what is—and is not—distinctive about poverty in California. in delivering this descriptive 
overview, we rely principally on the California poverty 
Measure (CpM), a measure that hews to the spirit of the 
Census Bureau’s supplemental poverty Measure (spM) 
but also improves on it by using administrative data and 
by taking into account unique features of California.3 
the CpM, like all spMs, provides an authentic por-
trait of the experience of poverty because it takes local 
housing costs into account, adjusts for non-discretion-
ary expenses (e.g., medical out-of-pocket costs, child 
care costs), and includes the poverty-reducing effects 
of non-cash and post-tax transfers (e.g., CalFresh, the 
Earned income tax Credit). although we will also report 
on the official poverty Measure (opM) for purposes 
of comparison and completeness, the CpM statistics 
arguably provide the best representation of the experi-
ence of deprivation and disadvantage in California.4 we 
summarize here the key features of California poverty in 
the form of six conclusions.
A high-poverty state: in any discussion of poverty 
in California, perhaps the most important point to be 
made is that we have much of it, indeed there is good 
reason to believe that California has the highest poverty 
rate in the u.s.5 as shown in Figure 1, 22.0 percent of all 
Californians were living in poverty in 2011, a percentage 
that’s substantially higher than the corresponding opM 
percentage for that year (i.e., 16.2).6 the relationship 
between the CpM and opM is complicated because 
some features of the CpM work to reduce poverty 
relative to the opM (e.g., incorporating non-cash and 
post-tax transfers) while other features work to increase 
it (e.g., allowing for high housing costs). the results in 
Figure 1 nonetheless make it clear that in the end these 
countervailing forces yield a poverty rate for California 
that’s far higher than the official one. 
Persistence of deep poverty: it might be thought that 
California’s high poverty rate is misleading because 
many families are just barely under the poverty thresh-
old and hence just barely in poverty. this is not the case. 
in fact, 6.1 percent of California’s population is in “deep 
poverty,” where this refers to families with incomes 
that are 50 percent or less of the poverty threshold.7 
although some of the counties with high rates of deep 
poverty are agricultural or rural (e.g., 6.8% in Merced 
figUrE 1: California Poverty Measure for full Population and by Age group
Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and Sarah Bohn. 2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within California Coun-
ties and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality (in collaboration with the Public Policy Institute of California),  http://www.inequality.com/poverty/cpm.
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County), others are urban or suburban (e.g., 
7.6% in san Diego County).
A persisting adult poverty problem: in conven-
tional opM-based analyses, it is frequently 
reported that children have much higher pov-
erty rates than adults, a result that reflects, 
in part, the distribution of cash benefits (e.g., 
social security) that the opM takes into 
account. Even under the CpM, the poverty 
rate for children is higher than that for adults, 
but the gap between the two rates is smaller. 
the gap closes because of disparities across 
age groups in the likelihood of receiving non-
cash and post-tax transfers (which the opM 
does not pick up). the poverty rate for chil-
dren, 25.1 percent, is of course especially 
high, but Figure 1 also shows that a full 21.4 
percent of working-age adults and 18.9 per-
cent of the elderly are in poverty in California. 
Housing-induced poverty: the conventional 
wisdom has long had it that poverty in Califor-
nia is disproportionately a Central valley affair. 
as Figure 2 reveals, there are indeed high pov-
erty rates in many Central valley counties (e.g., 
23.6% in yolo County), but more surprisingly 
there is also much poverty in urban California. 
figUrE 2: California Poverty Measure by County
Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and Sarah Bohn. 
2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within California Counties and Demo-
graphic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality (in collaboration with the Public 
Policy Institute of California),  http://www.inequality.com/poverty/cpm.
figUrE 3: California Poverty Measure by race, Ethnicity, and immigration Status 
Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and Sarah Bohn. 2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within California Counties 
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to produce the requisite college graduation rates, and 
(b) attend the types of colleges that provide substantial 
economic returns to their graduates (thereby ensuring 
that graduates indeed experience the low poverty rates 
of Figure 3). Moreover, any credible evaluation of such 
a policy would have to take into account its effects on 
the pay and employment prospects of those who do 
not attend college, effects that might be generated, for 
example, by any corollary reductions in the size of the 
low-skill labor force. that is, insofar as the number of 
college graduates is ramped up substantially, the asso-
ciated “siphoning off” of low-skill workers will reduce 
unemployment rates and raise wages among workers 
who remain in the low-skill sector and now experience 
less competition. it follows that a pro-college policy 
may indirectly reduce poverty even among those who 
are not direct beneficiaries of that policy.
the foregoing is merely an illustration of the (perhaps 
obvious) difficulties in formulating policy rather than any 
attempt at an authentic policy analysis. at this point, we 
are only pointing out that, however simple the descrip-
tive facts of poverty may seem, it is important to resist 
the temptation to move too quickly from facts to policy 
prescription. 
the poverty statistics for los angeles, san Francisco, 
and san Diego counties are 26.9, 23.4 and 22.7 per-
cent respectively.8 what accounts for such high rates 
of poverty? the key source is simple and obvious: in 
large urban counties, housing and other living costs are 
typically very high, often making it difficult for families to 
get by. although urban families may have better access 
to better-paying jobs, Figure 2 reveals that this labor 
market advantage is more than offset by the housing 
market disadvantage.
The immigrant effect: this is not to suggest that high 
housing costs are the only source of California’s unusu-
ally high poverty rates. the relatively large immigrant 
population in California is also relevant because, as 
shown in Figure 3, poverty rates among immigrants 
are exceedingly high, indeed 36 percent higher than 
poverty rates among natives (i.e., [29.9 – 19.1]/29.9 = 
.36). the native-immigrant disparity is especially pro-
nounced under the CpM because, unlike the opM, it 
registers safety net benefits that are often available for 
natives but not for immigrants. it bears noting that the 
CpM poverty rates for Blacks, hispanics, and asians 
are also relatively high. at the same time, the poverty 
rate for non-hispanic Blacks is lower under the CpM 
than the opM, partly because the opM does not take 
into account precisely those non-cash and post-tax 
transfers that especially benefit non-hispanic Blacks.
Large educational disparities: the latter disparities by 
race, ethnicity, and immigration status are large, but 
they are swamped by the even more dramatic dis-
parities between educational groups. as revealed in 
Figure 4, the chances of being poor are one in two for 
high-school dropouts (53.9%) and one in three for high-
school graduates (33.2%), but less than one in ten for 
college graduates (9.8%). these large educational dis-
parities are of course hardly distinctive to California.  if 
high rates of immigration and high housing costs are 
special features of the California poverty landscape, the 
substantial educational disparities most surely are not.    
the facts presented in this section do not easily translate 
to prescriptions about the most effective anti-poverty 
programs in California. it might be imagined, for exam-
ple, that the sizable educational disparities of Figure 4 
direct us to a policy of increasing the number of college 
graduates. although such a policy may be attractive in 
principle, its success would depend on ensuring that 
the new college entrants (a) have adequate preparation 
figUrE 4: California Poverty Measure by Education
Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and 
Sarah Bohn. 2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within Califor-
nia Counties and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality 
(in collaboration with the Public Policy Institute of California),  http://www.inequality.com/
poverty/cpm.
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The safeTy neT in California
Before laying out any new proposals, it is also important to examine the effectiveness of Cali-fornia’s current and ongoing policy, where 
“policy” is narrowly construed here as the effects of 
the safety net. it should be appreciated from the outset 
just how narrow this definition is. after all, the state’s 
poverty population is also directly affected by a host 
of institutional practices that are quite unrelated to the 
safety net itself, such as the provision of prenatal care, 
the size of the prison system, or the number of funded 
college slots. although these institutional decisions 
are not always understood as a form of poverty policy, 
they are in fact powerful determinants of the size of the 
poverty population and hence should be understood as 
such. if, for example, a decision were made to radically 
increase the number of funded college slots, the result 
might well be an accordingly dramatic reduction in the 
size of the state’s poverty population (subject to the 
caveats laid out above). we will indeed be presenting 
some key legal and institutional reforms that, if under-
taken, would yield substantial reductions in poverty. For 
the purposes of this section, we nonetheless focus on 
the more conventional and narrow definition of poverty 
policy, a definition that focuses wholly on the effects of 
the safety net itself.
we proceed by way of four conclusions that represent 
the key facts about how the state’s safety net is—or 
is not—working. For the purpose of these analyses, 
we deploy the CpM exclusively, as it is tailor made for 
assessing the effects of all types of programs, not just 
cash-based ones. in the following analysis of safety net 
effects, it should also be borne in mind that we are only 
reporting on the wholly “mechanical” effects of benefits 
(in pushing family income above the poverty threshold), 
not the possible second-order behavioral effects that 
any change in benefits might in the longer run bring 
about.   
Large effects of the safety net: the first conclusion 
about such mechanical effects is that they are quite 
large (see Figure 5). if all safety net benefits were sud-
denly eliminated (i.e., CalFresh, Calworks, tax credits, 
school meals, housing subsidies, ssi, social security), 
figUrE 5: the Poverty-reducing Effect of the Safety net by Age group
Source: “Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and Sarah Bohn. 2013. The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within California Coun-
ties and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality (in collaboration with the Public Policy Institute of California), http://www.inequality.com/poverty/cpm.
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the percentage of California’s population in poverty 
would increase by 12.9 points (i.e., from 22.0% to 
34.9%). whereas the poverty-reducing effect of the 
safety net is especially large for children (15.0 points) 
and the elderly (29.1 points), it is comparatively small 
for working-age adults (9.0 points). these results make 
it clear that, despite the many criticisms leveled against 
the state’s safety net, it is doing real and substantial 
poverty-reducing work in its current form. to be sure, 
the state’s poverty population remains the largest in the 
country even after our state’s safety net is applied, but 
that should not obscure the equally important point that, 
absent the safety net, the poverty population would be 
far larger (and would in fact rise to well over one-third of 
California’s population). 
Two safety nets: if the first conclusion is that the safety 
net has big effects, the second is that those effects 
work through rather different programs for children and 
adults. in effect, California has two safety nets, one for 
children and another for adults. the children’s safety 
net rests on the three-way punch of CalFresh, tax cred-
its, and Calworks, whereas the adult safety net relies 
rather more on the two-way punch of supplemental 
security income (ssi) and social security benefits. 
as Figure 5 shows, the combination of CalFresh, tax 
credits, and Calworks accounts for 80 percent of the 
safety net’s effect on child poverty (i.e., 12.0/15.0 = .80), 
but only for 54 percent of its effect on working-age pov-
erty and 4 percent of its effect on elderly poverty (i.e., 
4.9/9.0 = .54; 1.2/29.1 = .04). these differential effects 
should of course be taken into account when evaluating 
possible expansions of particular programs.
The dominance of EITC: we can cast further light on 
the “children’s safety net” by considering each of its 
constituent programs separately and recalculating 
the poverty rate under the hypothetical that the ben-
efits from that program are unavailable. this exercise 
reveals (see Figure 6) that poverty rates increase the 
most when tax credits are excised. if tax credits were 
completely eliminated, the poverty rate would increase 
to 31.1 for “all children” and to 32.6 for children under 
age 6. this result reflects the effect of (a) the overall 
size of the program (the number of beneficiaries and the 
average size of their benefits), (b) the extent to which 
the program targets the poor (as opposed to families 
whose incomes exceed the poverty threshold), and (c) 
the extent to which benefits to the poor are delivered to 
families that are close enough to the poverty threshold 
that the benefits will push them over it. the “tax credit” 
effect is so large in part because the Earned income 
figUrE 6: the Poverty-reducing Effect of the Safety net 
Among Children
figUrE 7: the Key role of “Extra Expenses” in  
generating Poverty Among Children
NOTE: The “No CalWORKs” bars also include the effects of excising general assis-
tance. Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, 
and Sarah Bohn. 2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within 
California Counties and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and 
Inequality (in collaboration with the Public Policy Institute of California), http://www.
inequality.com/poverty/cpm.
Source: Christopher Wimer, Marybeth Mattingly, Matt Levin, Caroline Danielson, and 
Sarah Bohn. 2013. “The California Poverty Measure: A Portrait of Poverty Within Califor-
nia Counties and Demographic Groups,” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality 
(in collaboration with the Public Policy Institute of California), http://www.inequality.com/
poverty/cpm.
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tax Credit (EitC) is such a large program. at the same 
time, the EitC often goes to families that are not in 
CpM poverty, with the offsetting result that the EitC’s 
poverty-reducing effects are not as large as one might 
imagine given the size of the EitC budget. this latter 
feature of the EitC is obviously crucial in assessing a 
state supplement to the EitC. although there are impor-
tant work-incentivizing benefits to delivering ongoing 
assistance to families already out of poverty, there is 
an obvious tradeoff between ensuring adequate incen-
tives and ensuring adequate benefits to families that are 
beneath the poverty line.
The importance of extra expenses: the next figure 
reveals the role of “extra expenses” in driving up the 
poverty rate (see Figure 7). By “extra expenses,” we 
mean both (1) out-of-pocket medical expenses, and (2) 
expenses incurred principally as a cost of going to work 
(i.e., child care, transportation costs for work). Could 
we reduce poverty substantially by adopting programs 
that reduced or eliminated these “extra expenses?” the 
simple answer: yes. in fact, if we could find a way to fully 
eliminate such expenses, 25.5 percent of all children in 
poverty would be lifted out (i.e., [25.1 – 18.7]/25.1 = 
.255) and 24.7 percent of children under age 6 would 
be lifted out (i.e., [26.3-19.8]/26.3 = .247). these results 
imply that roughly a quarter of California’s child pov-
erty is generated by medical, child care, and other work 
expenses. it is of course too early to tell whether the 
affordable Care act will have an appreciable effect on 
the poverty-inducing effects of such extra expenses. 
we again do not mean to imply that the preceding 
results lead to any direct policy prescriptions. rather, 
we provide them here only as “facts on the ground,” 
facts that serve mainly to illuminate how our safety net 
is working and the problems that remain and that new 
anti-poverty initiatives might address.
the stanford center on poverty and inequality    9 
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evidenCe and values in poverTy poliCy 
We turn now to a discussion of the types of anti-poverty policies that California might consider and the likely effectiveness of those policies. 
in reviewing the available evidence, we do not mean 
to suggest that any policy decision can be “evidence-
based,” indeed even the more relaxed and fashionable 
standard of “evidence-informed” policy proves to be a 
high bar. there is much research showing, for example, 
that policy tends to be formed on the basis of a host 
of non-scientific factors, including judgments about the 
political feasibility of particular programs, the interests 
of particular advocates or lobbyists, an especially com-
pelling image or narrative about the sources of poverty 
or the effectiveness of particular programs, or a ten-
dency to favor the most fashionable “flavor-of-the-day” 
program or intervention.9
it is not simply that these political forces and psycho-
logical biases inevitably intrude into the policymaking 
process. Even if these biases could be cleared away 
and a straightforwardly science-based decision became 
possible, the unfortunate fact of the matter is that the 
science has not yet developed to the point that it can 
always provide an entirely clear and definitive judgment 
on the optimizing policy. the available science falls 
short of that (very high) standard in at least two impor-
tant ways.
Difficulty of making comparative assessments: the first 
and most obvious point is that the available science, 
for all its successes, does not always or even usually 
provide clear guidance on the matter of which policy 
is optimizing as against the full range of choices. the 
available research typically speaks to the more narrow 
question of whether any given program or policy has a 
demonstrable effect. in principle, the availability of such 
research allows us to eliminate from consideration any 
policy for which effects cannot be demonstrated, but it 
cannot assist in the more demanding task of choosing 
an optimizing policy from among the host of possibilities 
that have not been so eliminated. it is a mixed blessing 
in this regard that, although there are many negative 
assessments of program effectiveness, we are left with 
even more programs and policies for which the requisite 
research has not yet been carried out, is inconclusive, 
or suggests positive effects. the resulting embarrass-
ment of riches, however attractive in the abstract, leads 
to difficulties in making bona fide science-based deci-
sions. although there have been some efforts to carry 
out comparative cost-benefit assessments of multiple 
policies, these are still quite limited in the range of 
programs covered and the exhaustiveness with which 
costs and benefits are identified.10
Design problems: Even when one drops back to the 
more limited objective of evaluating a single program 
or policy, the available evidence is often based on 
research designs that fall short of the ideal and yield 
accordingly inconclusive evidence. the gold standard 
is conventionally understood to be a randomized con-
trolled trial (rCt) that allows us to formally assess the 
likelihood that any observed differences in outcomes 
are attributable to preexisting differences between the 
subjects. in the absence of rCts, there are still many 
high-quality research designs that can yield convincing 
assessments of causal effects (e.g., regression dis-
continuity), indeed the development and application of 
such alternatives has been one of the more important 
recent achievements of the field. we will be reviewing 
many studies deploying either rCts or one of these 
alternative approaches. if our capacity for causal infer-
ence is accordingly better than ever, it is obviously not 
good enough to reach definitive conclusions on all the 
programs and policies of interest. there are unfor-
tunately many areas in which none of the available 
research designs is strong enough to reach unambigu-
ous assessments.
this is all to suggest that, because the available evi-
dence is far from definitive, our task cannot reduce to 
that of simply determining which interventions work 
best and then bundling those interventions into a larger 
anti-poverty program. Even if the available evidence 
were definitive, a haphazard assemblage of “what 
works” would likely make for a poor safety net, as such 
an assemblage wouldn’t amalgamate into anything 
coherent or take into account our larger commitments 
about how our institutions are best organized. if a pro-
gram does not resonate with these commitments, our 
support for it will be partial and mired in controversy 
from the start.
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it is far better, then, to focus on programs that not only 
“work” in a narrow sense but that are also consistent 
with the country’s most fundamental beliefs about how 
our safety net institutions should be structured. this line 
of reasoning suggests a set of reforms that express our 
shared commitment to the principles of equal oppor-
tunity and the value of work. although the u.s. is a 
heterogeneous country with many competing views, 
there is much evidence that these two commitments are 
quite widely accepted.11 we review each in turn below. 
Equal opportunity: in the u.s., we are committed to 
ensuring that all children, no matter how poor, have an 
opportunity to develop their talents and capacities. this 
commitment is difficult to realize given that opportunity 
is often “on the market” and available for purchase: 
that is, well-off parents can afford high-quality health-
care, child care, and schooling in ways that then 
advantage their children, whereas poor parents cannot 
afford to “purchase opportunity” for their children to the 
same extent. however difficult to achieve, an earnest 
commitment to the principle of equal opportunity has 
nonetheless long figured in american discourse, indeed 
this commitment is even laid out in drafts of the coun-
try’s founding documents.12 if our safety net is built 
around the principle of equalizing access to opportu-
nities, it becomes an institution that is consonant with 
fundamental american values. it becomes our insti-
tution expressing our values. the equal opportunity 
approach, which we lay out below, accordingly focuses 
on a package of interventions that allow children from 
poor families to have fair and equal access to opportu-
nities to develop their capacities, skills, and credentials. 
Making work pay: if the commitment to equal oppor-
tunity is deeply cherished in the u.s., so too is the 
principle that everyone should work (insofar as they are 
able to do so) and that hard work should pay off. in 
1996, the u.s. welfare system was revamped to encour-
age employment and reduce welfare dependency, a 
reform that was followed by a substantial decline in the 
size of the nonworking poor population.13 if a new round 
of safety net reform is consonant with this commitment 
to work and making work pay, it will again express our 
deepest values and garner widespread support. we will 
discuss below a variety of reforms, including tax credits, 
that are consistent with this commitment. 
the programs discussed below are not, then, simply 
an assemblage of what works.14 in building a better 
safety net, it is equally critical to bring it into close align-
ment with our most cherished commitments, thereby 
ensuring that it becomes an institution to which most 
can wholeheartedly commit. there are of course many 
interventions on offer that satisfy this constraint. the 
purpose of the following review is to transparently report 
on the evidence for these interventions, noting when it 
lends itself to strong conclusions, when it falls short of 
that standard, and when opinions differ on the matter of 
how strong the evidence is.15 
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The eQual opporTuniTy plan 
We begin, then, by laying out a plan that will increase opportunities for poor children to develop their skills and talents. this approach 
is founded on the growing consensus that cost-effective 
policy (1) identifies the key junctures in the lifecourse 
that determine the development of skills and capacities, 
and (2) intervenes at those junctures in ways that off-
set the disadvantages facing low-income children and 
adults. 
it is of course difficult to equalize opportunities fully and 
completely because children born into middle-class 
families will inevitably have access to better health-
care, better child care, better schools, and all manner 
of other advantages that will ultimately assist them in 
the labor market. the cumulative effect of such advan-
tages can nonetheless be reduced with compensatory 
programs targeted to key junctures when capacities are 
being formed or decisions are being made. although 
this approach naturally leads one to early interventions, 
there are also critical junctures in the later lifecourse 
that are cost-effective to target, as discussed at the end 
of this section of the report.16 
the following discussion will be organized temporally by 
laying out cost-effective interventions at each succes-
sive stage of the lifecourse. we start with home-visiting 
programs that begin prenatally; we then turn to early 
education for preschool and older children; we follow 
with a targeted set of interventions for school-age chil-
dren and young adults; we next consider job training 
reforms principally oriented toward adults; and we con-
clude by discussing a set of legal and tax reforms that 
reduce discrimination and (partly) compensate for barri-
ers to opportunity confronted early in life. 
The very early lifecourse
the purpose of home-visiting programs is to improve 
child and adult health practices, improve parenting 
practices, and provide referrals to available social ser-
vices. these programs are built around home visits by 
nurses or trained staff who provide at-risk mothers with 
guidance on (a) diet and other prenatal practices, (b) the 
child’s health and development, and (c) parenting. the 
main rationale for such programs is that they identify at-
risk children early on, intervene before problems cascade 
into much larger ones, and thereby lead to improved 
health, parenting, and cognitive development in ways 
that have substantial long-term benefits. although most 
home-visiting programs focus on improving health, they 
also provide an opportunity to complete more general 
case work, such as referral to available social services.
these programs are based on the growing evidence that 
prenatal and early childhood experiences affect neural 
functions and structures that in turn shape future cog-
nitive, social, emotional, and health outcomes.17 Even 
at 18 months old, children from poorer households are 
much slower at identifying pictures of simple words, 
such as “dog” or “ball.”18 By kindergarten, there is a sub-
stantial gap between poor and middle-class children in 
reading skills, such as recognizing letters and beginning 
word sounds. there are likewise substantial differences 
in math skills (e.g., counting, recognizing basic shapes) 
and in behavioral regulation.19 Because the effects of 
poverty register so early in children, and because these 
effects then have long-lasting consequences, there is 
a compelling argument to intervene early in ways that 
will reduce these consequences. the home-visiting 
approach rests on precisely this argument.
thE CaliFornia BaCkDrop
the home-visiting landscape in California is com-
plicated by virtue of a large number of overlapping 
providers, funding sources, and target populations. we 
first review the two main home-visiting programs and 
then turn to four subsidiary programs that are targeted 
to more specific problems or populations. 
The California Home Visiting Program: the California 
home visiting program provides comprehensive and 
coordinated in-home services for pregnant women or 
mothers of children (up to age 5) residing in at-risk com-
munities. there are currently 22 federally funded sites 
using services based on one of two nationally recog-
nized home visiting models, either healthy Families 
america (hFa) or the nurse-Family partnership (nFp). 
under the healthy Families america model, home 
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visiting is carried out with trained workers who use a 
standardized assessment tool to identify needs and 
then educate new or expectant parents on child health, 
positive parenting, and available services. the second 
prong of the California home visiting program is based 
on the nurse-Family partnership model. whereas the 
healthy Families america model relies on trained work-
ers, the nurse-Family partnership model instead relies 
on nurses who provide information and support to first-
time mothers throughout their pregnancy and until their 
babies reach two years of age.20 
First 5 California: the second main home-visiting initia-
tive is supported by First 5 California, which provides 
funds to county commissions to deliver local programs 
in child development, child health, and family function-
ing. in total, First 5 supports 58 county commissions, of 
which 22 invest in home-visiting programs for newborns 
and parents after hospital discharge. these programs 
send trained professionals into homes to support first-
time, teen, low-income, and rural parents. the First 5 
program also provides parenting and early education 
services.21
Disability programs: the balance of California’s home-
visiting initiatives are more narrowly targeted to particular 
types of problems or to particular populations. the Early 
start program, for example, involves home visiting for 
families with infants or toddlers who have disabilities or 
developmental delays. the Department of Developmen-
tal services (DDs) also operates regional Centers that 
offer home visiting for older children (3-21 years old) 
with developmental disabilities.
Mental health programs: the pathways to well Being 
initiative, which was created under the katie a. settle-
ment, provides mental health services for children in 
foster care or at risk of entering foster care. the services 
provided under this initiative often entail home visiting.22
Child abuse and neglect programs: the case manage-
ment services delivered by the Child welfare services 
entail frequent home visits to safeguard children who 
may be at risk of abuse or neglect. these services are 
provided to all at-risk children (including those in foster 
care).
American Indian Infant Health Program: this program, 
which serves five counties, involves home visitations for 
at-risk american indian families with children under 5 
years old. the program uses either public health nurses 
or paraprofessionals to provide information about health 
care and available services. 
as this list reveals, California’s home-visiting landscape 
is quite complicated, with various providers, many 
funding streams, different protocols for delivering assis-
tance, different subpopulations that are served, and a 
wide mix of targeted problems (e.g., mental health, child 
abuse). it also bears noting that Calworks, which is 
California’s main welfare-to-work program, provides 
home-visiting services as well, although these visits are 
typically not directed as explicitly to health and mental 
health issues as the foregoing programs are. 
thE proposal
the home-visiting landscape in California is complicated 
by virtue of a large number of overlapping providers, 
funding sources, and target populations. the current 
tapestry of programs is a patchwork affair that misses 
some at-risk families and is often focused on narrowly 
delineated health problems rather than the larger family 
situation. the home-visiting program might accordingly 
be reformed by improving both the breadth and depth of 
services. these two objectives—expanding the number 
of families served and expanding the breadth of ser-
vices offered—may be best secured by establishing a 
centrally coordinated delivery system (possibly similar 
to the regional Centers operated by the DDs). although 
an exact estimate of unmet need is unavailable, the 
best data suggest that approximately 465,000 California 
families with children up to age 5 are in CpM poverty, 
have young children, and are not currently being served 
by the California home visiting program or the Early 
start program.23 
thE EviDEnCE
the case for home-visiting programs is backed by a 
large body of randomized controlled trials and other 
high-quality research that demonstrates their effec-
tiveness.24 the u.s. Department of health and human 
services has designated a number of home-visiting 
models as evidence-based, but we focus here on the 
research evaluating the nurse-Family partnership (nFp) 
and healthy Families america (hFa), as both are fea-
tured in the California home visiting program. Because 
hFa has been implemented differently in different sites, 
the findings from hFa evaluations are harder to evalu-
ate. there is, however, much available research on hFa, 
including 34 studies in 25 states, of which 8 are ran-
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domized controlled trials.25 although a wide range of 
outcomes have been evaluated for both nFp and hFa, 
we concentrate here on such key outcomes as health, 
education, and economic self-sufficiency.
Health effects: the health benefits of nFp and hFa are 
clear and overwhelming. although the specifics of the 
results differ across nFp and hFa, the general pattern 
is one of reduced child abuse, increased home safety, 
reduced emergency medical care, and improved devel-
opmental outcomes.26 likewise, there are clear health 
benefits for participating mothers, including improved 
prenatal health (e.g., reduced hypertensive disorders, 
reduced cigarette smoking).27
Education effects: the research evidence on cognitive 
development and school readiness is also favorable. 
the children participating in home-visiting programs 
have been shown to be more attentive, to regulate their 
behavior better, and to develop better language skills. in 
a well-known randomized controlled trial, six-year-olds 
enrolled in an nFp “demonstrated higher intellectual 
functioning and receptive vocabulary scores… and had 
fewer behavioral problems,” as compared to children 
treated with minimal support services.28 
Parental self-sufficiency: the foregoing health and edu-
cational benefits should parlay into improved outcomes 
for children over the very long run (as they enter college 
and ultimately the labor force). But we also care about 
the economic situation of the parents receiving home 
visits. Do hFa and nFp lead to a reduced use of social 
programs and improved employment outcomes? the 
answer to this question is resoundingly positive in the 
case of nFp. according to a recent meta-analysis, only 
two studies showed ambiguous or unfavorable out-
comes on self-sufficiency, whereas 20 studies showed 
significant improvements. the results for hFa are rather 
more ambiguous. in the same meta-analysis, only three 
of the reviewed studies showed a positive impact on 
family self-sufficiency, whereas two showed an unfavor-
able or ambiguous effect and 37 showed no effect at 
all.29 
the simple conclusion is that extending services to 
all at-risk families in California will, at minimum, yield 
substantial health dividends.30 we don’t have as clear 
evidence on the payoff to expanding the model to pro-
vide case management, program coordination, and 
program referrals.31 it bears noting that the most suc-
cessful home visiting programs have typically been 
those that maintain a high degree of fidelity to the 
model.32 Moreover, insofar as any revisions to the model 
are made, they are most likely to be successful when 
they take the form of simple and self-contained addi-
tions.33 the implication is that, were a broader array of 
case management services indeed built into the model, 
the extension should probably take a straightforward 
form (e.g., a checklist of services) and should be rigor-
ously tested to ensure that it’s delivering benefits.
the skeptic might worry that home-visiting programs 
address symptoms rather than causes and therefore do 
not cut to the heart of California’s poverty problem. in 
evaluating this claim, it is useful to distinguish between 
(a) the poverty arising from problems with labor sup-
ply (e.g., underinvestment in human capital), and (b) the 
poverty arising from problems on the demand side (e.g., 
shortage of jobs, excess of low-wage jobs). the home-
visiting program of course addresses the supply side 
of the problem. as we’ve just discussed, there may be 
some immediate effects of home-visiting programs on 
parental human capital and self-sufficiency, but home-
visiting programs mainly operate in the long run by 
affecting the future self-sufficiency of children growing 
up in families that have experienced those programs. 
that is, insofar as poverty in its unchecked form leads 
to various health, cognitive, and other developmen-
tal problems, a home-visiting program has protective 
effects that can ultimately improve the capacity of at-
risk children to make human capital investments (e.g., 
investments in a college education). if there are enough 
high-quality training slots to accommodate this new 
capacity for investment (e.g., enough college schol-
arships), then home visiting programs will reduce the 
number of low-skill workers and increase the number 
of high-skill workers. the poverty rate will accordingly 
be reduced, not just because the children from home-
visiting programs are more likely to develop the skills 
that bring about higher wages, but also because there 
will be fewer low-skill workers and hence less in the way 
of wage-reducing competition among them. it follows 
that, under the foregoing quite plausible assumptions, 
a home-visiting program can be understood as a sys-
temic response to California’s poverty. it obviously will 
not eliminate poverty, but it can reduce it in a sustained 
and fundamental way. 
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there are, as we have noted, a few key assumptions 
behind this line of reasoning. we have assumed, for 
example, that the ramped-up home visiting program will 
be paired with a ramped-up commitment to providing 
the education (e.g., vocational training, college) that the 
new demand for human capital investment will make 
necessary. it would of course be wasteful to increase 
our children’s capacity for human capital investments 
without also increasing California’s capacity to meet the 
resulting new demand for training opportunities. put dif-
ferently, a successful home visiting program will create 
a new bulge at the bottom of the training pipeline, a 
bulge that some fifteen years later will need to be met 
by increasing opportunities at the top of that pipeline 
(e.g., high-quality college slots, high-quality vocational 
training slots). 
the more proximate need, of course, will be to develop 
the new capacities that will appear in the middle of this 
pipeline. if an expanded home visiting program yields 
the expected health and cognitive gains for very young 
children, the logical follow-up is to cultivate those gains 
by ramping up opportunities to participate in early child-
hood education. we therefore turn next to a discussion 
of early childhood education programs and how they 
might indeed be “ramped up.”
early Childhood education
the home visiting program arguably takes the early-
intervention approach to its logical limit by intervening 
prenatally. although early childhood education (ECE) 
programs of course start after birth, they are still under-
stood as a classic example of an early intervention 
approach. the empirical rationale for these programs is 
much the same as that for home visiting: the available 
evidence suggests that key cognitive and behavioral 
inequalities are typically established before children 
begin formal schooling and sometimes do not increase 
all that much thereafter. the income gap in achievement 
tests, for example, is already very large when children 
enter kindergarten and remains much the same size as 
children progress through elementary school.34 the pur-
pose of ECE is to take up where home visiting programs 
left off by providing the early experiences, stimulation, 
and training that can prevent such a large gap from 
emerging before children enter kindergarten. 
thE CaliFornia BaCkDrop
in California, the commitment to early childhood educa-
tion is already substantial, with a number of programs 
in play. the most important programs are the following:
General Child Care: operated by public or private agen-
cies, General Child Care occurs in centers and family 
child care home networks, with the funding coming 
from both state and federal sources. although some 
older children with exceptional needs are provided 
General Child Care, it is mainly offered to children from 
birth through 12 years of age. 
California State Preschool Program: the California 
state preschool program, which is the largest state-
funded preschool program in the country, serves 3- to 
4-year-olds with both part-day and full-day services. it 
is administered through local education agencies, col-
leges, nonprofits, and community action agencies. 
Alternative Payment Program: using both state and 
federal funding, the alternative payment program (app) 
helps families select and arrange child care services, 
with the payment then made directly to the provider. 
the app was established to increase parental choice 
and accommodate the individual needs of the family.
CalWORKs Child Care: under the Calworks program, 
three stages of child care programming is provided, 
each drawing on state and federal funding. the first 
stage, which begins when a participant enters the Cal-
works grant program, may be delivered via the app 
program or via direct payments to providers. the sec-
ond stage begins when the family situation is stabilized, 
and the third stage begins two years after families stop 
receiving cash aid. the second and third stages are 
both delivered through the app.
Head Start and Early Head Start: the head start pro-
grams, which are of course federally funded, serve 
children from birth to 5 years of age with both part-day 
and full-day programs. although they rely on federal 
funding, California’s head start programs are adminis-
tered through agencies that typically also have contracts 
to administer either General Child Care or the California 
state preschool program (and often these programs are 
accordingly located at the same site). 
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as with home visiting programs, this is a relatively com-
plicated patchwork of programs, which perhaps argues 
for simplifying access for families by establishing a 
more integrated system (see Restructuring California’s 
Child Care and Development System for a compre-
hensive proposal in this regard).35 there is, however, 
already some coordinative work. in each of California’s 
58 counties, local child care and development plan-
ning councils support the coordination of child care 
services, with their mandate being to conduct assess-
ments of county child care needs and to prepare plans 
to address identified needs. 
the more important problem with the current system 
is that it is underfunded. Because of this underfunding, 
it has proven difficult to meet demand and to provide 
sufficiently high quality care. we elaborate these points 
below. 
Meeting demand: there are two main roads into a state 
or federally subsidized ECE program in California. the 
first road, the one via Calworks, brings a guarantee 
of child care subsidies.36 the second road, the one for 
non-Calworks families, does not entail a guarantee, 
indeed there are long waiting lists for non-Calworks 
families. although these families meet income eligibility 
requirements (i.e., less than 70 percent of the state’s 
median income in 2007–08),37 funding is inadequate to 
satisfy the demand. the upshot is that many low-income 
families are not receiving ECE.38 according to the latest 
data, only 37 percent of 3- and 4-year-olds below 200 
percent of the official poverty line are enrolled in pre-
school (public or private), whereas 56 percent of their 
higher-income counterparts are so enrolled.39 if ECE 
subsidies were extended, this enrollment gap would 
clearly be reduced, although some of the gap arises 
from factors other than financial need. 
Improving quality: there is also ample room to improve 
the quality of the state’s ECE system. as discussed 
below, the quality issue is all important, given the evi-
dence that high-quality ECE may be especially effective 
in reducing poverty. the last systematic assessment of 
the quality of California’s ECE was completed in 2007 
and showed that poorer children were disproportion-
ately found in preschools with larger class sizes, a less 
emotionally supportive environment, and lower stu-
dent engagement.40 Following this report, the California 
Department of Education developed the preschool 
learning Foundations (plF), a guide for early learn-
ing and cognitive development that is aligned with the 
state’s kindergarten curriculum. although the plF cur-
riculum is not required, it is intended to guide curricular 
choices in state-sponsored preschools and improve 
quality in all ECE programs. unfortunately, the most 
recent evidence suggests that ECE quality in Califor-
nia is still lagging, indeed the national institute for Early 
Education research (niEEr) ranks California’s pre-
school quality in the bottom tier of u.s. states.41
thE proposal 
the preceding review makes it clear that (a) there aren’t 
enough ECE slots in California for low-income children, 
and (b) the available slots are not all of adequate quality. 
if one were to craft an ECE reform, it should accordingly 
address either or both of these deficiencies:
Increase the number of ECE slots: the number of ECE 
slots should be increased to ensure that all demand 
from low-income families is met.42  
Improve the quality of ECE slots: the quality of existing 
or new ECE slots should be increased to meet structural 
and processual targets (e.g., class size, quality of stu-
dent engagement).
we review below the evidence on the likely payoff to 
either of these reforms. although there is much high-
quality research on both types of interventions, the task 
of summarizing this research is complicated because, 
as extensive as such research is, it nonetheless does 
not resolve all questions of interest.
thE EviDEnCE
in discussing the evidence, the standard and natural 
starting place is the now-famous evidence on two inten-
sive and small-scale programs, the perry preschool and 
abecedarian programs.43 the perry preschool study 
was based on an experiment with random assignment 
of low-income african-american children to either the 
experimental condition (i.e., attending the perry pre-
school) or a control group that entered kindergarten at 
age 5. in the experimental condition, children attended 
the preschool from ages 3 to 5, with classes meeting 
2.5 hours per day for 5 days per week. the program 
included weekly home visits with the children and their 
parents (and in this regard may be understood as an 
amalgam of home visiting and conventional preschool 
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programs). the key result: the members of the treat-
ment group increased their cognitive and noncognitive 
skills as well as earnings, were less likely to be arrested, 
and were less dependent on social programs. the 
abecedarian program, which was similar in intensity, 
yielded roughly comparable results. 
are such positive results only found in small-scale 
programs? absolutely not. the best-known study of a 
public preschool program, the Chicago Child-parent 
Centers, showed effects similar in size to those of the 
perry and abecedarian programs.44 there have likewise 
been very promising results in the Boston public school 
pre-k program.45 the average ECE effect across all 
programs is sizable: in a recent meta-analysis of 123 
quasi-experimental and experimental studies of ECE 
programs, the long-term effects on cognitive outcomes 
(e.g., test scores), school progress (e.g., high-school 
graduation), and socio-emotional development were all 
found to be quite large.46 
the main interpretive complexity is that randomized trial 
assessments of head start (hs) and Early head start 
(Ehs) have yielded less favorable results.47 although 
hs and Ehs initially have positive effects on various 
cognitive measures, these effects tend to disappear 
by the end of kindergarten (i.e., effect “washout” ). the 
rate of fadeout for present-day cohorts appears to be 
faster than has been observed for children who were in 
head start in the 1960s through 1980s.48 For this earlier 
cohort, the effect on test scores persists, indeed long-
term impacts on adult outcomes are approximately 80 
percent as large as those for small-scale programs, 
like perry preschool and abecedarian. there is much 
debate about why hs effects appear to be washing 
out more quickly now.49 the “catch-up hypothesis,” 
which is very plausible, has it that elementary schools 
are becoming increasingly successful at remediating 
deficits among children who enter kindergarten without 
the benefit of preschool. that is, rather than recent hs 
participants experiencing “fade-out,” we may be seeing 
recent non-participants “catching up” through increas-
ingly intensive remediation in elementary schools. the 
catch-up hypothesis implies that this more aggressive 
remediation has only become possible because hs 
has reduced the number of under-performing students 
delivered to the schools. 
the evidence is likewise unclear on the matter of 
whether California should increase the number of ECE 
slots, increase the quality of existing ECE slots, or opt 
for both at once. the main concern in this regard is that 
we do not yet have a fully developed science on what 
makes for “high-quality” ECE. if we commit to ramping 
up quality, it is essential that we exploit what is already 
known, build in high-quality experimentation across 
counties, and move swiftly to best practices as the sci-
ence continues to develop.50 
late Childhood interventions
we have to this point reviewed two rather early inter-
ventions (i.e., home visiting, early childhood education). 
although the evidence behind these interventions is 
strong, there is also compelling evidence on behalf 
of many later educational interventions, evidence to 
which we will now turn. the lifecourse is studded with 
a series of critical junctures, some of which occur very 
early in life (e.g., early brain development), but others of 
which occur later on (e.g., college entry).51 if we do not 
address these later critical junctures as well as the early 
ones, we will not fully exploit the increased capacity for 
human capital investments secured by ramping up early 
childhood experiences. the task before us, therefore, is 
to identify the late childhood junctures that are blocking 
children from investing in human capital. 
this line of reasoning leads us directly to those junc-
tures at which children decide to undertake high-quality 
vocational training and to prepare for, apply to, attend, 
and complete college. as Figure 4 showed, the chances 
of being poor are one in two for high-school dropouts 
(53.9%) and one in three for high-school graduates 
(33.2%), but less than one in ten for college gradu-
ates (9.8%). if the number of college graduates and 
well-trained workers were increased, the state would 
accordingly secure real and tangible benefits in the form 
of reduced program spending and increased income 
taxes.52 it is especially important to increase college 
investments given that the shortage of college-educated 
workers will, according to the best available projections, 
likely worsen in California over the next decade.53 the 
best possible source from which to draw these new col-
lege-educated workers is in fact low-income families: 
that is, students from disadvantaged backgrounds are 
not just the least likely to attend college, but they are 
also the most likely to secure economic benefits from 
college.54 
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it is therefore especially important to identify those 
blockages late in the lifecourse that prevent students 
from attending college or undertaking high-quality 
vocational training.55 as we have repeatedly noted, the 
two-pronged virtue of increasing human capital invest-
ments is that (a) those who make them are less at risk 
for poverty, and (b) those who do not make them are 
competing against a depleted pool of low-skill laborers 
and hence will face less in the way of wage-reducing 
and employment-reducing competition for the available 
low-skill jobs. 
thE CaliFornia BaCkDrop
there are many programs and institutions designed to 
assist the state’s low-income children as they negoti-
ate primary and secondary school. we review below 
the key features of this programmatic and institutional 
landscape.
Title 1: the most prominent federal effort to help 
low-income students is title 1 of the Elementary and 
secondary Education act of 1965. this program is 
intended to equalize educational opportunities and is 
used for such purposes as dropout prevention, fund-
ing assistance for the advanced placement exam, and 
supplementary reading and literacy programs. 
LCFF: the shift to the local Control Funding Formula 
(lCFF) within California provides supplemental funds 
to districts with high proportions of high-need students 
(i.e., low-income students, foster youth, English learn-
ers).  at the same time, lCFF allows school districts 
to more flexibly allocate funds across programs, while 
also requiring them to document educational outcomes 
of students.
Community Schools: in some California communities, 
the school serves as a hub for connecting low-income 
students and their family to services and programs, 
such as CalFresh. this “community school” model 
sometimes takes a modest form (with relatively few 
linked organizations and services) and sometimes a 
more aggressive form. the promise neighborhood ini-
tiative, which is reviewed below, may be understood as 
an especially well-developed and elaborated rendition 
of the community school.56
Summer and after-school programs: Because low-
income children experience large learning losses during 
the summer, many schools and community organiza-
tions have instituted high-quality summer enrichment 
programs (e.g., “summer Matters”), with funding from 
federal, state, and private sources. these summer 
programs are supplemented with a wide range of after-
school programs funded by the after school Education 
and safety program (a voter-approved initiative passed 
in 2002) as well as other federal and non-profit sources.
College preparation and access programs: there are a 
variety of programs designed to increase college appli-
cation and enrollment by providing low-income students 
with extra advising, tutoring, peer mentoring, test 
preparation, academic enrichment, information about 
admission requirements, and financial aid workshops 
(e.g., Cal-soap, Cash-for-College, Early academic out-
reach programs, Early Commitment to College).
the preceding list pertains only to programming within 
primary and secondary schools (and is but a partial list 
of even that class of programming). it therefore omits 
(a) the loan, grant, and work-study programs designed 
to increase low-income access to colleges and (b) the 
many programs designed to raise completion rates 
among low-income students already attending col-
lege.57 
thE proposal
there is a sizable scientific literature on the effectiveness 
of title 1 programs,58 community schools,59 summer 
and after-school programs,60 and college preparation 
and access programs.61 the evidence on these pro-
grams indicates that many are effective and serve the 
low-income population well. as the local Control Fund-
ing Formula is implemented in California, children from 
disadvantaged families may have increased access to 
many of these programs, thus equalizing opportunities 
within the later lifecourse. 
this is not to suggest that California should rely exclu-
sively on the changes that the lCFF may bring about. 
the state would do well to additionally exploit a newer 
class of informational and social-psychological inter-
ventions that, by building on these programs, offer 
unprecedented opportunities for substantial returns at 
very low cost. the simple insight behind these interven-
tions is that many key investments (e.g., going to college) 
require students to overcome entrenched impediments 
to good decision-making and follow through.62 these 
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impediments can be overcome with informational and 
social-psychological interventions that have been 
rigorously tested and can now be incorporated into 
California’s existing programming at low cost:
A social-psychological intervention: a series of brief 
training exercises can reverse debilitating beliefs about 
capacities and lead to sizable and long-lasting gains in 
academic achievement.
Informational support: By providing better information 
and waiving application fees, low-income students 
with a record of superior achievement will apply to and 
attend colleges that are well matched to their capacities 
and talents.
A text-messaging intervention: a low-cost program 
of personalized (but automated) text messages can 
increase college attendance among low-income stu-
dents.
these seemingly small interventions, all rigorously 
tested with high-quality research designs, have been 
shown to yield returns that would likely repay the rela-
tively low costs of implementing them.
thE EviDEnCE
we begin with the case of informational support. the 
well-known problem here is that high-achieving stu-
dents from low-income families often opt against going 
to college or choose poorly-performing colleges that 
do not fully exploit their capacities or maximize their 
chances of graduating. although this problem could be 
addressed by hiring more high-school advisors, a cost-
effective alternative is to cull the relevant test and grade 
data and send individualized information to low-income 
students indicating appropriate college matches, 
financial options, and how to apply. the relevant experi-
mental results are very strong: when a treatment group 
is sent this information and provided fee waivers, their 
rates of application, acceptance, and enrollment are 
substantially higher than those of the control group.63 
the estimated per-student cost of this intervention is 
very low. 
are there equally inexpensive interventions that affect 
actual achievement? indeed there are. over the last 
decade, a series of randomized field experiments have 
shown that small social-psychological interventions tar-
geting thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about school have 
had striking and lasting effects on educational achieve-
ment. the evidence shows, for example, that a sharp 
increase in math achievement is observed when mid-
dle-school students attend an eight-session workshop 
teaching them that cognitive capacity, far from being 
determined at birth, is in fact malleable because “the 
brain is like a muscle and grows with effort.”64 there 
is currently research under way demonstrating how 
these and related interventions can be taken to scale 
and reduce the growing achievement gap between poor 
and well-off students. 
the third intervention aims at increasing the rate at 
which low-income students show up for their first year 
of college (after having been accepted). at the cost 
of approximately $7 per student, attendance rates 
for low-income students can be increased by send-
ing automated (but personalized) text messages that 
(a) remind them of important tasks to complete as the 
beginning of the term approaches, and (b) refer them to 
other support services as necessary.65 the latter costs 
can be recovered via reduced program costs and higher 
earnings (and accordingly higher tax revenues).
these three interventions proceed from the recognition 
that big problems are sometimes amenable to highly 
targeted and narrow-gauge solutions. although there 
is no disputing that early childhood education yields 
higher payoffs than conventional late interventions (e.g., 
conventional job training programs), it is not clear that 
it yields any higher payoffs than these targeted infor-
mational and social-psychological interventions.66 the 
simple point here: Because there are several critical 
junctures in human capital formation, a smart anti-pov-
erty policy will take on each of them, not just the early 
ones. the objective, then, is a comprehensive supply-
side policy that intervenes at all of the high-payoff 
junctures and thereby prevents blockages from emerg-
ing at any point in the supply chain for skilled labor. it 
bears noting that, while the late interventions featured 
here have compelling evidence behind them, a host of 
others also hold promise and might be developed into a 
fuller suite of late interventions.67 
Workforce development
we next consider workforce training programs that 
typically entail intervening after secondary schooling 
has been completed. these programs, which have not 
always performed well in evaluation studies, are some-
times pitched as the prototypic low-return alternative to 
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high-return early investments.68 although the evidence 
for workforce training programs is indeed less attrac-
tive on average, we review here some relatively new 
programs that hold promise and that warrant more sub-
stantial investments.
the simple rationale for job training programs is that 
they can build skills that, in principle, increase employ-
ability and wages. that is, just as a college degree 
elevates skills and qualifies workers for higher-paying 
jobs, so too training programs can qualify workers for 
high-skill craft, service, and technical jobs and move 
them out of crowded low-wage markets. if these pro-
grams are operating well and at sufficient scale, they 
will help not just those who directly participate in them 
but also those who remain in the low-skill sector (by 
reducing the number of competitors within that sector). 
these two effects, taken together, should in theory work 
to reduce poverty.
is such theory realized in practice? there are two main 
reasons why often it is not. Most obviously, insofar as 
the programs in question focus on job search rather 
than job training, then the foregoing skill-upgrading 
effects are no longer directly in play. if there are none-
theless poverty-reducing effects of such programs, they 
arise principally because recipients can transition more 
rapidly into available low-wage jobs. these programs 
allow, in other words, the market to clear more quickly. 
the second and equally obvious caveat is that train-
ing programs will only yield a return when they develop 
skills that are in high demand. the latter point argues 
for “sectoral programs” in which the type of training 
on offer is adjusted to reflect the needs of expanding 
sectors. the available evidence on sectoral programs, 
which is reviewed below, suggests that they can yield 
sizable returns. 
CaliFornia BaCkDrop
the main fiscal backdrop to this discussion is an ongo-
ing shift in federal support from job training to higher 
education. the federal funding for the pell Grant pro-
gram, which provides vouchers covering college tuition 
and related expenses for low-income students, dwarfs 
that for job training.69 
the commitment to job search and job training nonethe-
less remains substantial and takes place in community 
colleges, american Job Center offices, and a variety of 
Calworks programs. the community colleges offer a 
host of state-funded training programs; the american 
Job Centers, which are federally funded, provide job 
search and job training opportunities; and Calworks 
operates a variety of programs to transition clients into 
work. with the new workforce innovation and oppor-
tunity act (wioa), just passed in 2014, the training 
landscape in California will likely shift somewhat. the 
new act will consolidate training and search programs, 
promote sectoral training for high-demand industries 
and occupations, and improve services to individuals 
with disabilities.  although California’s one-stop centers 
now mainly provide job search assistance, it is possible 
that wioa will promote a shift to job training.70 
thE proposal
the evidence reviewed below suggests that the ongo-
ing transition to sectoral programs is sound policy. with 
the implementation of wioa, the transition to sectoral 
training will likely continue and may even intensify, but 
additional changes in California’s system of financing 
community colleges may also be required. Because the 
technical training for California’s emerging sectors is 
often more costly to offer, the current system of financ-
ing, which is based on a simple per-student formula, 
does not always provide adequate incentives to offer 
the courses that are most needed.71 
thE EviDEnCE
the evidence on the effectiveness of workforce devel-
opment programs is extensive and often high quality. 
there are three key results coming out of this literature.
Modest effects of general training programs: the best 
and most recent estimates of the returns to general 
training programs reveal a modest increase in the earn-
ings of disadvantaged adults who undergo training.72 
these increases, which tend to be larger for women 
than for men, are mainly attributable to increases in 
hours worked rather than higher wages. although some 
of these effects fade over time, most analysts find that 
they are still large enough to be cost-effective (albeit not 
necessarily as cost-effective as early childhood inter-
ventions).73 
Modest effects of mandatory employment and training 
programs: there is also a substantial literature on the 
effects of employment and training programs for welfare 
recipients. these programs, which are often mandatory, 
tend to be most effective when participants are not 
mandated to first engage in job search before turning 
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to training.74 the evidence suggests that, for low-skill 
workers and those with outdated skills, job training pro-
grams have larger effects on employability and earnings 
than job search programs.75
Sectoral programs may yield larger effects: the sectoral 
approach to workforce development targets training to 
particular employers that need workers or to particu-
lar sectors of the economy in which labor demand is 
strong. these programs often combine community 
college training with work experience. although much 
research on sectoral programs is now under way, the 
evidence accumulated to date shows that participants 
in sectoral programs are more likely to be employed and 
have substantially higher earnings.76 in some cases, 
employers have been resistant to sectoral programs 
that target the disadvantaged, but this reluctance can 
be overcome.
these results suggest that, insofar as any supplemen-
tary investments in workforce development are made, 
sectoral approaches may well yield the highest payoff. 
Because community colleges have become the center 
of contemporary workforce development, this ongoing 
shift to sectoral programs may be best promoted by 
developing new funding formulas that incentivize com-
munity colleges to carry out training in high-demand 
fields and to work in close collaboration with relevant 
employers.
Creating Jobs and Making Work pay
the equal opportunity approach, which focuses on 
upgrading the skills and capacities of California’s 
labor force, might be criticized for ignoring the role of 
low-paying jobs and inadequate demand in generat-
ing poverty. after all, if the main problem is that there 
aren’t enough jobs and the available jobs just don’t 
pay enough, shouldn’t we take the bull by the horns 
by simply increasing the number of jobs and the pay 
of existing jobs? we address this criticism by turning 
to demand-side approaches that address poverty by 
(a) directly creating jobs for the disadvantaged, and (b) 
supplementing the income, via tax credits, of those who 
are working in low-wage jobs.
the demand-side approach may be understood as a 
direct response to the “jobs problem” in California. the 
unemployment rate in California, currently at 7.0 per-
cent, is the 3rd highest in the country; the discouraged 
worker rate, which includes those who have “given up” 
looking for work, is the 5th highest in the country; and 
the labor force underutilization rate, which also takes 
into account underemployment and marginal forms 
of attachment, is the second highest in the country.77 
whereas a labor-supply approach addresses the jobs 
problem by attempting to shift workers into sectors 
where demand is higher (i.e., high-skill sectors), there is 
also a long history of addressing it by directly expand-
ing employment opportunities for the hard-to-employ. 
this approach has been viewed as especially attractive 
in raising employment rates for groups (e.g., blacks) 
that face discrimination even when they have the req-
uisite skills. 
there are of course two types of “job problems” in 
California. the first problem, as was just discussed, is 
that there aren’t enough jobs, while the second prob-
lem is that the available jobs often do not pay enough 
to protect against poverty. the second problem, like 
the first one, could be addressed with a labor-supply 
approach: By increasing their skills, workers are more 
likely to escape the low-wage sector, which not only 
raises their own wages but also tamps down wage-
lowering competition among those still in that sector. 
the demand-side approach takes on the same problem 
more directly by supplementing the income of low-wage 
workers via the minimum wage or the Earned income 
tax Credit (EitC). Because there are ongoing efforts to 
further raise California’s mimimum wage, the comments 
below will focus on the possibility of a parallel effort to 
increase the EitC.78
we have suggested that wages in the low-skill sector are 
unduly low because the sector is flooded with workers 
who have not had a full and open opportunity to secure 
higher skills. the approaches discussed in the prior 
sections are intended to equalize such opportunities: 
we need to expand home-visiting programs because 
we want all children, no matter how rich or poor their 
parents, to be raised in environments that protect their 
health and develop their capacities; we need to expand 
early childhood education because we want all children, 
no matter how rich or poor their parents, to be raised in 
environments in which those capacities are cultivated 
and have an opportunity to flourish; and we turn to late-
childhood interventions because we want all children, 
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no matter how rich or poor their parents, to have full and 
complete access to college or other training opportuni-
ties. it will of course take more time than we would like 
for these opportunity-equalizing programs to bear fruit. 
if tax credits are applied now, we can immediately raise 
the pay of low-skill workers and thereby compensate, 
if only partially, for the reduced opportunities that most 
of them faced earlier in their lives. although the need 
for such wage support will lessen as soon as oppor-
tunities are equalized, there is a pressing need to prop 
up wages now given that the low-skill sector is flooded 
with workers who did not have many opportunities. 
it also bears noting that any meaningful commitment to 
equal opportunity must go beyond such wage support 
by addressing the legal and institutional sources of pov-
erty. the careful reader will note that—to this point—our 
discussion has followed convention by conflating anti-
poverty policy with safety net policy. this conflation, 
however conventional, is deeply problematic. after all, 
wages and unemployment are also directly affected by 
a host of legal and institutional practices that are quite 
unrelated to the safety net itself, practices that lead to 
(a) systematic failures to pay workers for overtime and 
other work hours (i.e., “wage theft”), (b) an especially 
high risk of incarceration for children born into poverty 
(notably african americans), and (c) employment dis-
crimination against mothers, many racial and ethnic 
groups, undocumented immigrants, and the formerly 
incarcerated. these various forms of discrimination, 
each of which is inconsistent with a commitment to fair 
pay and equal opportunity, can be addressed through 
legal reform and  improved enforcement (much of which 
can be implemented at the state level).  
thE CaliFornia BaCkDrop
in California, a wide range of demand-side initiatives are 
in play, initiatives that rely either on subsidized employ-
ment programs or on income supplementation, via tax 
credits, for low-wage workers.79 these initiatives fall 
into the following three classes. 
Subsidized employment programs: in a subsidized 
employment program, jobs are provided for those 
who cannot find employment in the regular labor mar-
ket, with public funds used to pay all or some of their 
wages. the american recovery and reinvestment act 
(arra) allowed Calworks to expand its subsidized 
employment program in 2009 and 2010. although this 
emergency funding is no longer available, Calworks 
has nonetheless continued a subsidized employment 
program, allocating $39.3 million to it in fiscal year 2013-
14. this program creates fully or partially subsidized 
jobs in partnership with private employers, non-profits, 
and public agencies. 
Hiring credits: the California Enterprise zone program 
provided tax credits to businesses in economically 
depressed areas for hiring “disadvantaged” workers. 
this program, which was eliminated in 2013, has been 
replaced by a hiring credit for businesses in census 
tracts with high unemployment and poverty rates.80 the 
federal equivalent, the work opportunity tax Credit, 
provides tax credits to employers who hire from certain 
target groups that have faced barriers to employment.81
Earned Income Tax Credit: the EitC, which is of course 
a federal program, is designed to supplement income 
for low-earnings workers. For households with very low 
earnings, the dollar amount of the EitC increases as 
earnings rise, a design that incentivizes work. in recent 
years, approximately 20 percent of California tax filers 
qualified for the EitC, with the average filer receiving 
$2,302 (in 2012).
it is conventional to treat subsidized employment, 
hiring credits for employers, and the EitC as very dif-
ferent programs. For our purposes, they are usefully 
classed together because all of them treat poverty as a 
demand-side problem that is best addressed by either 
(a) creating more jobs (via subsidies or tax credits to 
businesses), or (b) reducing the number of “poverty 
jobs” (via tax credits to low-earning workers). 
thE proposal
Because the evidence for subsidized employment is 
quite mixed (as will be discussed), the most promising 
demand-side approach is to create a California state 
EitC. to date, 26 states have their own state-funded 
EitCs, usually taking the simple form of a fixed per-
centage of the federal credit. if the federal EitC were 
supplemented by ten percent, California would be a 
“middle-of-the-pack” state (relative to other states cur-
rently providing supplementation). 
the second and equally important class of wage-
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enhancing and job-creating reforms are those that 
address unfair pay and employment practices. we are 
referring here to legal and institutional reforms that 
eliminate wage theft, unequal and discriminatory risks 
of incarceration, as well as employment and pay dis-
crimination against mothers, disadvantaged racial and 
ethnic groups, undocumented workers, and the for-
merly incarcerated.
thE EviDEnCE 
as noted below, there is a long history of interest in pub-
lic sector employment for the poor, indeed it extends 
back to the war on poverty. although president Johnson 
rejected proposals at that time for a substantial job cre-
ation program, a few relatively modest programs were 
created in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., neighborhood 
youth Corps [nyC], work incentives program [win], 
Job opportunities in the Business sector [JoBs], Com-
prehensive Employment and training act [CEta]). in the 
late 1970s, president Carter expanded CEta, especially 
its programs for public sector employment for the poor. 
under the Carter administration, tax credits to private 
employers were also used to expand job opportunities 
for certain categories of disadvantaged workers, an ini-
tiative tagged the targeted Jobs tax Credit (and now 
renamed the work opportunity tax Credit).
these initiatives are of interest because they provide 
an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of direct 
job creation. the two main questions of interest are (a) 
whether the participants in these programs experienced 
long-term benefits (on earnings, employment, and other 
labor market outcomes), and (b) whether the programs 
work to increase overall employment. the evidence on 
both questions has been mixed. 
on the matter of long-term benefits to participants, the 
evidence shows that they are typically quite modest, 
except when the jobs programs also provided an inten-
sive set of support services to the participants.82 in a 
careful meta-analysis of 97 studies, it was recently con-
cluded that “subsidized public sector jobs programs are 
generally less successful” than job search and training 
programs, a result that reinforces much of the previous 
research on this question.83
the results on the second question are equally mixed. 
on the positive side, there is some evidence that sub-
sidized public sector jobs can generate a net increase 
in employment, although only when the programs care-
fully target the types of jobs that are created and the 
types of workers who are employed.84 with such careful 
targeting, it is not the case that public sector employ-
ment simply substitutes for private sector employment, 
in the end yielding no net increase in employment.85 
although the available evidence suggests, then, that a 
net increase in employment can be generated, it has 
to be borne in mind that costs per participant may be 
high. the benefits of employer tax credits (e.g., the 
work opportunity tax Credit) are even less clear: the 
oft-noted problem with such programs is that firms can 
benefit from participation even without changing their 
hiring practices. indeed, when firms participating in tax 
credit programs were surveyed by the Department of 
labor, only 10 percent reported any change or modifi-
cation of their hiring practices for purposes of securing 
the credit.86  
it is results such as the foregoing that have led most 
scholars to conclude that the EitC is a preferred 
approach. this conclusion is based in part on the 
now overwhelming evidence that the EitC increases 
employment and earnings.87 when the EitC has been 
expanded, the increases in employment among families 
with children are quite substantial, especially among 
those with female family heads.88 the downstream 
benefits of the EitC are likewise impressive: the EitC 
improves the mental and physical health of mothers, 
reduces the likelihood of low birth-weights, improves 
the performance of children on cognitive tests, and 
increases college enrollment.89 although we have 
emphasized the direct effects of the EitC on compen-
sation, this extra money delivered to parents makes it 
into a supply-side intervention as well. when parental 
income is increased, children are raised in healthier and 
less stressful circumstances, which in turn positions 
them to make more substantial human capital invest-
ments. this is why hilary hoynes recently concluded 
that the EitC may “ultimately be judged one of the most 
successful labor market innovations in u.s. history.”90
Does it follow that an expanded EitC could fully solve 
California’s poverty problem? this seems rather unlikely. 
if an EitC supplement were adopted in California, many 
families in deep poverty would simply not benefit from 
it. From its inception, the EitC has been intended to 
incentivize work, which means that families without 
workers will not directly benefit from it. the ongoing rise 
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of nonworking poverty would therefore go quite unad-
dressed by a typical EitC-based reform.91 this suggests 
that, insofar as a state EitC were adopted, it should 
be coupled with other reforms, especially increased 
Calworks funding, that assist those in even more pro-
found need. the equal opportunity reforms discussed 
above may be usefully paired with a ramped-up EitC 
precisely because such reforms would assist children 
and adults in more profound need.
this part of the equal opportunity plan, unlike the 
foregoing parts (i.e., home visiting, early childhood edu-
cation), thus relies on cash transfers or tax credits.  are 
such transfers or credits difficult to reconcile with core 
u.s. values?  absolutely not.  the EitC is consistent 
with the country’s values not just because it ensures 
that “work pays” but also because it compensates for 
the reduced opportunities that most recipients faced 
earlier in their lives.  this is not, however, the only way 
in which income transfers are opportunity-equalizing 
interventions. the EitC and Calworks also equalize 
opportunities for the next generation: that is, by raising 
the income of poor families, the EitC and Calworks 
act to level the playing field for the children raised in 
these families. there is growing evidence that, when 
income is transferred to poor families, the children in 
these families ultimately grow up healthier, have higher 
earnings, and work longer hours.92 
the legal and institutional reforms noted above are an 
equally important component of the equal opportunity 
plan.  although we have focused much of our com-
mentary on safety net reform, this complementary legal 
and institutional reform cuts to the heart of any com-
mitment to equal opportunity and must accordingly be 
understood as central to any meaningful equal opportu-
nity plan. the available evidence, which suggests such 
reform would dramatically raise employment and wages 
in high-poverty populations, again speaks to the power 
of policies that address causes (e.g., discrimination) 
rather than symptoms (e.g., low pay, unemployment).93
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iMpleMenTing The eQual opporTuniTy plan
T he foregoing approach, which we have dubbed the equal opportunity plan, entails bringing together a set of cost-effective interventions 
that are targeted to critical moments in the lifecourse. 
although many of these interventions (e.g., early child-
hood education) have been represented as “stand 
alones” that suffice in and of themselves, the equal-
opportunity approach is distinctive by virtue of bundling 
them together, addressing each of the critical junctures 
in the lifecourse, and thereby endeavoring to remove 
blockages at each stage in the supply chain. the payoff 
to a home-visiting approach, for example, is only fully 
realized insofar as the children benefiting from it can 
then be “handed off” to early childhood education pro-
grams that will exploit new capacities for human capital 
investment. 
it is accordingly important that this sequence of pro-
grams are properly coordinated in ways that ensure a 
successful “hand off.” this coordination may occur in 
either a centralized or decentralized way. under a cen-
tralized approach, the coordination problem is solved 
at the state level, with representatives of state service 
agencies (e.g., California Dept. of social services) 
endeavoring to build programs that integrate well with 
one another.  this is of course an ongoing and imper-
fectly realized process.
the alternative approach, to which we’ll now turn at 
length, instead approaches the coordination problem at 
the local level. it recognizes that, in any given community, 
the constellation of service providers is quite variable 
and that community-specific plans for integrating them 
are likely to be most successful. the best-known ini-
tiative of this sort, promise neighborhoods, may be 
understood as a particular rendition of an equal oppor-
tunity approach. that is, promise neighborhoods also 
take an intensive approach to child development, but 
the onus rests on each neighborhood to develop com-
prehensive plans for integrating services based on input 
from local non-profits, businesses, schools, municipal 
governments, community residents, and social science 
researchers.94 these plans describe how local constitu-
ents can come together to provide counseling for new 
parents, health services, high quality education, and 
job training for youth. as this list reveals, the services 
themselves are very similar to those described above 
(as part of an equal opportunity approach), but they are 
now being coordinated and delivered under the direc-
tive of a community-specific plan.  
to date, the promise neighhorhood initiative has been 
federally funded, with two stages of federal fund-
ing available. the first stage in becoming a promise 
neighborhood is to apply for a small federal planning 
grant (approx. $350,000–$500,000) that funds commu-
nity leaders to build local relationships and ultimately 
develop a comprehensive implementation plan. if that 
plan is then supported, the second stage is to secure a 
further multimillion-dollar “implementation grant,” again 
with federal funds. the latter grant, although typically 
not large enough to support direct services, can be 
used to ensure that services are well coordinated and 
delivered in accord with the larger community plan.95
the purpose of this section is to describe this decen-
tralized form of service delivery in some detail. at 
this point, there is not enough evidence to determine 
whether the services comprising the equal opportunity 
plan are best delivered in a centralized or decentralized 
way, given that (a) the evidence on the effectiveness of 
a decentralized approach is still accumulating, and (b) 
an explicit comparison of centralized and decentralized 
approaches to delivery has not been undertaken. we 
will therefore simply report on such evidence as is cur-
rently available on decentralized service delivery. 
thE CaliFornia BaCkDrop
to this point, we have placed special emphasis on the 
promise neighborhood initiative, as it is the most prom-
inent neighborhood revitalization initiative in the country 
and is also quite directly focused on supply-side inter-
ventions. the current landscape of neighborhood-based 
interventions in California is nonetheless rather broader 
and encompasses both demand-side and supply-side 
initiatives.
Promise Neighborhoods: to date, four communities in 
California have received implementation grants (i.e., 
los angeles, Chula vista, san Francisco, hayward), 
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and another three communities have received planning 
grants (i.e., Corning, Campo, Fresno).96 the los ange-
les initiative, which is the largest, is a public-private 
partnership of the city, the county, and the los ange-
les unified school District.97 the implementation grant 
will be used to transform 19 neighborhood schools 
into full-service community schools and to open 6 
community centers and dozens of smaller satellite cen-
ters. it will offer 65 programs for youth and families in 
partnership with 60 local organizations. the other com-
munities receiving planning and implementation grants 
are relying on smaller federations of schools and service 
organizations.
Promise Zones: the promise zones initiative is a related 
federal program aimed at comprehensive neighborhood 
redevelopment through job creation, increased eco-
nomic security, expanded educational opportunities, 
increased access to affordable housing, and improved 
public safety.98 unlike promise neighborhoods, which 
are quite relentlessly supply-side in their approach, 
promise zones also incorporate various demand-side 
interventions (e.g., job creation). the first five program 
awards were announced in 2014 and included los 
angeles as one of the sites. although promise zones 
do not receive any dedicated grant funding from the 
federal government, they are given priority in receiving 
grants from already existing federal sources. 
Strong Cities, Strong Communities (SC2): the sC2 ini-
tiative, which includes Fresno in its first cohort of cities, 
is likewise focused on demand-side interventions (e.g., 
economic development, job creation) as well as supply-
side ones.99 like the promise zones initiative, it allows 
local governments to acquire and use federal funds 
more effectively for transportation projects, community 
development projects, and other investments.
the key problem facing California is that the demand 
for promise neighborhoods and other neighborhood 
initiatives exceeds the available funding. although 78 
communities in California have applied for planning and 
implementation grants for promise neighborhoods, only 
seven have received one or both. it is possible, then, 
that an equal opportunity approach of the sort laid out 
above could be implemented in a decentralized fashion 
by funding a comprehensive system of promise neigh-
borhoods. this initiative, which could be administered 
by the state Department of Education, might reason-
ably fund both planning and implementation grants, as 
in the federal initiative.100
thE EviDEnCE
it is not yet possible to rigorously evaluate the effec-
tiveness of promise neighborhoods because they have 
only recently been awarded. the harlem Children’s 
zone (hCz), which was founded in the 1970s and then 
ramped up in the 1990s, has served as the inspiration 
for the federal initiative and accordingly provides an 
obvious opportunity for indirect evaluation of the prom-
ise neighborhood concept. the hCz programs include 
instruction for expecting parents, education on child 
development, a full-day preschool, a charter school as 
well as in-classroom and after-school support for pub-
lic school students, youth development programs for 
public middle-school students, and various college pre-
paratory services.101 
the most rigorous evaluation of the program exploited 
the lottery for enrollment into hCz charter schools to 
compare the performance of lottery winners against 
lottery losers.102 according to the lottery estimates (as 
well as other instrumental variable estimates), students 
who attended an hCz charter school had much higher 
math and English test scores, with the hCz boost being 
big enough to close the black-white achievement gap 
in math by 9th grade and in English by 3rd grade. the 
same gains in achievement were not experienced by 
siblings of hCz charter students who were ineligible to 
attend the hCz schools (due to age cut-offs). Because 
these siblings did have access to the hCz community 
programs, it appears that the gains in test scores were 
attributable to charter school attendance rather than 
the associated community programs. also, because 
hCz charter students from outside the zone performed 
as well as those inside the zone, it would again appear 
that wrap-around community services were less impor-
tant (as those from outside the zone rarely used these 
wrap-around services).
the preceding evaluation, although widely heralded, 
has not gone unchallenged. in a follow-up assessment 
by the Brookings institution, the test scores from an 
hCz charter school were compared to those from other 
non-hCz charter schools, a design that does not exploit 
the lottery for enrollment into hCz charter schools.103 
this study instead used statistical controls to adjust for 
demographic and socioeconomic differences between 
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the students attending hCz and non-hCz schools. the 
results from this design were clearly less impressive: 
the test scores of hCz charter students were only in 
the middling ranges when compared to test scores for 
non-hCz charter schools. 
which result is to be believed? although we cannot 
review the substantial literature on the hCz evaluation 
here, a key point is that students in the hCz charter 
school started out with much lower test scores than 
those attending the non-hCz schools in the Brookings 
institution study.104 the test scores for hCz students 
grew rapidly off this low baseline, but not rapidly enough 
to catch up with the best non-hCz scores. it follows 
that the lottery design yielded a more favorable result 
because it properly protected against preexisting differ-
ences between the treatment and control groups. the 
nonexperimental approach, by contrast, did not fully 
control for differences in baseline conditions across the 
schools being compared. the consensus view, then, is 
that the hCz has yielded impressive results. 
this is not to suggest that the proposed promise neigh-
borhoods initiative will necessarily yield results that are 
just as favorable. the main worries in this regard are 
threefold:
Will a leaner version work? the hCz costs were approx-
imately $19,000 per student in 2009.105 this includes 
$4,657 per student in hCz-covered school costs and 
$2,172 per student in after-school and wrap-around 
costs. it is of course unclear whether a leaner program 
will generate different results.
Are community-based services needed? the hCz 
results called into question the returns to community-
based services. if the very favorable results were indeed 
secured mainly by ramping up school quality, it might 
be more cost-effective to concentrate on school reform 
alone.106
Can an adequate level of coordination be achieved? the 
hCz is a highly centralized organization that operates 
all charter schools and community programs under the 
same umbrella. By contrast, very few of the first prom-
ise neighborhood planning grantees had preexisting 
relationships with local schools before applying for their 
implementation grants, a state of affairs that contrasts 
sharply with that of the highly centralized hCz. it is 
unclear whether the high level of coordination achieved 
under the centralized hCz can be successfully repro-
duced in other communities.107
the latter question of coordination cuts to the heart of 
the promise neighborhood initiative. in principle, there 
is much to be said for locally-generated coordination, all 
the more so because the sources and types of poverty 
vary by community, the constellation of service provid-
ers varies by community, and the available resources 
vary by community. what is unclear, however, is whether 
a local approach can bring about the desired coordina-
tion without also adopting the centralized organizational 
structure of an hCz.108 the simple upshot: the available 
science clearly establishes the value of an equal oppor-
tunity approach, but it does not yet clearly establish 
whether centralized or decentralized delivery will yield 
the highest payoff.
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Can a Case for safeTy neT reforM be Made?
I n understanding why California has so much poverty, it is useful to distinguish between the poverty gener-ated by (a) an economy that fails to deliver enough 
jobs and, in particular, enough poverty-escaping jobs, 
(b) a complex of health, family, and training institutions 
that fails to provide low-income children with adequate 
opportunities to develop their capacities and acquire 
skills, and (c) a safety net that fails to step up and ade-
quately remediate the damage wrought by (a) and (b) 
together. we have discussed the first two sources and 
now conclude our report by considering the third.
how, then, might we grade California’s safety net? if 
any overall assessment is to be had, it is that the state’s 
safety net is hard-pressed to cope with the very high 
rates of poverty that our still-struggling economy and 
deeply flawed training institutions have handed it. in the 
introduction to this report, we showed that California’s 
poverty rate would increase by 12.9 points (from 22.0% 
to 34.9%) if all safety net benefits, both federal and state 
alike, were suddenly eliminated (see Figure 5). in evalu-
ating this result, one can at once be impressed with (a) 
the size of the reduction (i.e., 12.9 points), and (b) the 
percentage of the population that remains in poverty 
even after the safety net does its work (i.e., 22.0%).
it’s the latter interpretation, however, that leads to the 
view that a ramped-up safety net might deliver a rather 
larger reduction in poverty. Because many families in 
poverty are not using the programs available to them, 
the state’s poverty rate could, at least in theory, be sub-
stantially reduced by more aggressively disseminating 
information about programs, by making the enrollment 
process as frictionless as possible, or by ensuring that 
clients are in the optimizing constellation of programs. 
it cannot be ruled out that a cost-effective approach 
to addressing California’s high poverty rate is simply 
to ensure that our existing programs are well and fully 
used. the purpose of this final section is to examine the 
likely returns to such an approach.
there is good reason to believe that take-up could be 
improved for at least some California programs. among 
those eligible for CalFresh, only 53 percent receive 
benefits, a participation rate that ranks California dead 
last among the states.109 although this rate is artificially 
lowered in California because ssi recipients, who have 
characteristically high participation, are ineligible for 
CalFresh, it is still likely that take-up in California could 
be increased substantially.110 as for the EitC, approxi-
mately 71 percent of eligible Californians receive the 
credit, again a participation rate that is substantially 
lower than that for the country as a whole.111 By contrast, 
Calworks serves approximately 50 percent of children 
in poverty, a rate that is higher than in most states.112 
Even so, it is clear that Calworks is still underused, 
especially by immigrants and single mothers.113 there 
are of course many reasons why Calworks and other 
programs are underused, including a misunderstand-
ing of eligibility requirements, the belief that program 
participation is stigmatizing or unnecessary, and the 
difficulties and inconvenience of applying.114 
it may be possible to overcome some of these problems 
with a streamlined application process and improved 
advertising and dissemination of information. Even for 
scholars of poverty, the landscape of available pro-
grams and services in California is complicated, as is 
the process of applying for them. For residents of Cali-
fornia, there is an integrated online system for applying 
to Calworks, CalFresh, and MediCal (which, depend-
ing on the county, is either Calwin, C-iv, or lEaDEr), a 
separate online system for applying for unemployment 
insurance (EDD online) and Disability insurance (sDi 
online), a related online job center providing training and 
job search assistance (and the associated america’s 
Job Centers of California), an online portal for determin-
ing eligibility and enrolling in health care (CalhEErs), a 
separate online system for applying for federal social 
security benefits, a required in-person application for 
supplemental security income (including the California 
supplement), a community-specific application process 
for head start, and an online application process for the 
California lihEap program. this is, by any standard, a 
daunting landscape. 
there are two ways forward when the program envi-
ronment is so complicated. the first approach, that of 
centralizing and streamlining the application process, 
requires (a) solving the technical problem of building 
high-quality websites and other application systems, 
and (b) solving the administrative and legal problem of 
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aligning policies across disparate programs.115 there 
are currently no plans in California to effect cross-pro-
gram aligning and streamlining of this sort (although 
one of the online systems for applying to Calworks, 
CalFresh, and MediCal is being updated). the second 
approach, by contrast, takes the complicated land-
scape of programs for granted and focuses on helping 
Californians negotiate it with the assistance of pro-
gramming (e.g., home visiting) delivered under an equal 
opportunity approach.
it follows that, insofar as an equal opportunity approach 
is adopted, one should first understand its effects on 
take-up before proceeding with any further reform. 
if the take-up problem remains even after the plan is 
implemented, then clearly an alternative or supplemen-
tary effort is required. the most promising way forward 
in this case may be to take seriously the task of align-
ing programs and streamlining the application process. 
this new process could be built—from the ground up—
on insights from behavioral economics that have been 
demonstrated to increase take-up. 
it is relevant in this regard that the u.s. Department of 
health and human services has undertaken an exten-
sive study of the returns to rebuilding the application 
process in ways that exploit some of the key principles 
of behavioral economics.116 that is, rather than assum-
ing that clients will incorporate and dispassionately 
weigh all available evidence, this approach recognizes 
that the human capacity for attention, cognition, and 
self-control is limited in ways that may interfere with 
take-up. in one of their experimental projects, the 
research team examined why incarcerated noncustodial 
parents typically do not apply for a modification of their 
child support orders, even though doing so would have 
reduced their accumulated debt while incarcerated. 
the team undertook a full redesign of the application 
that entailed sending a teaser postcard notifying poten-
tial applicants for modification in advance of their first 
full-blown letter (“awareness raising”), using a short 
checklist to simplify the application process (reduced 
“cognitive load”), mentioning that other parents had 
their child support orders reduced to as low as zero 
(“social influence” effect), pre-populating the forms with 
existing administrative data (reduced “hassle factor”), 
and gently reminding those who failed to respond (“the 
nudge”). these revisions, taken together, brought about 
a large increase in take-up. 
if the same principles were systematically applied to 
each of California’s programs, the increased take-up 
would likely reduce poverty substantially. the appli-
cation process, now streamlined, could also be made 
available via a smart phone application. as of 2013, 43 
percent of those with household incomes of less than 
$30,000/year mainly used their smart phone to access 
the internet, a result likely driven by the relatively high 
cost of maintaining other devices (e.g., laptops, tab-
lets, desktop computers).117 it would also be possible to 
deliver automated and personalized messages remind-
ing clients of reapplications, informing them of work, 
training, and school opportunities, and otherwise pro-
viding access to help and services. there is a growing 
body of evidence showing that personalized reminders 
of this sort, when crafted in accord with the best behav-
ioral principles, can strongly influence behavior.118 this 
new cadre of “automated caseworkers” could accord-
ingly provide personalized cradle-to-grave service for 
pennies on the dollar, release the human casework staff 
from routine administrative tasks, and instead allow 
them to devote their time to high-value activities.
it follows that the ongoing experimentation with such 
behavioral principles should be carefully watched. 
if take-up problems persist even after the the equal 
opportunity plan is implemented, it may be in Cali-
fornia’s interest to integrate these principles into its 
application process. 
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ConClusions
We led off this report by noting that California’s poverty rate, which now stands at 22.0 per-cent, is higher than that of any other state. 
worse yet, the poverty rate for high-school dropouts is 
a shocking 53.9 percent, a rate over five times higher 
than that for college graduates. the safety net has of 
course stepped up to the challenge by reducing poverty 
substantially relative to what would have prevailed in its 
absence (see Figures 5 and 6). that said, even after the 
safety net has done all its important work, we are left 
with more than one in five Californians in poverty and 
the highest poverty rate in the country.
why hasn’t this dismal state of affairs led to the usual 
task forces, the development of a new antipoverty 
plan, and concerted action? there are, to be sure, 
many reasons why poverty hasn’t been taken on, but 
an especially important one is that we haven’t known 
how to do so in a way that’s both backed by science 
and consistent with our beliefs about how a safety net 
should work. we therefore default to a business-as-
usual stance in which safety-net funding plods along, 
the poverty research industry plods along, and there is 
but a vague and distant hope that ultimately a magic-
bullet solution will present itself. 
we do not need to wait any longer. the main purpose of 
our report has been to display just how far the relevant 
science has come and to craft an anti-poverty program 
rooted in that science. although the evidence is not 
always clear-cut, there is a growing consensus around 
a two-pronged approach that combines opportunity-
equalizing and wage-raising reform. this approach is 
well-tested, yields returns in excess of the investments, 
is consistent with our most fundamental commitments 
about how labor markets should be set up, integrates 
well with existing programming in California, and can 
be delivered with a centralized or decentralized (e.g., 
promise neighborhood) approach. 
the resulting program is not about treating symptoms, 
not about providing short-term relief, and certainly not 
about charity. it is about building a training system, 
labor market, and economy that provide opportuni-
ties for everyone and that ensure decent rewards for 
hard work. Because the proposed supply-side and tax-
credit reforms treat the upstream causes of poverty, 
they will bring about a permanent reduction in the size 
of the poverty population and reduce future demands 
on the safety net. the poverty population will perma-
nently shrink because low-income children will have 
new opportunities to develop capacities and make 
high-payoff investments in skills. By virtue of these 
opportunities, children from low-income families will no 
longer be mired in the low-wage sector, which not only 
raises their own wages but also reduces wage-lowering 
competition among the shrinking number of children 
who do remain in that sector. 
the evidence behind this program is strong, but it is 
not just evidence alone that recommends it. it is also 
attractive because, unlike some safety net programs 
and interventions, it comports well with the country’s 
long-standing commitment to equalizing opportunity 
and ensuring that hard work pays off. we too often 
embrace the latest flavor-of-the-day programs simply 
because they “work” and have supporters. this is surely 
understandable: after all, only rarely does any poverty-
reducing program have much support, so we’re loathe 
to be all that principled when one finally does. the great 
virtue, however, of a more principled approach is that 
it lays out our commitments clearly and allows us to 
build our institutions in defense of them. the equal-
opportunity approach, for example, reminds us that 
we’re committed to providing opportunities for all chil-
dren and that we’ll intervene aggressively whenever 
that commitment is circumvented. when our safety net 
tells a simple story in this way, it becomes a cherished 
institution that we hold near and dear, an institution that 
makes sense to us and that we’re especially willing to 
defend.
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